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ABSTRACT
One of the more latent effects caused by the strategy 
of confrontation open to organized crime, held in 
Mexico from the last six years, has been the transfer 
of the main criminal groups towards the Northern 
Triangle of Central America. From this scenario, 
this article’s research aims to answer the following 
question: Why this territory has become the new 
headquarters for major Mexican cartels? For this 
purpose, are analyzed under a qualitative approach, 
the main factors that have facilitated the expansion 
of Mexican organized crime in that geographic area. 
Then, addresses and dynamic connections between 
Mexican cartels and other criminal organizations 
operating in the sub region as carriers and gangs. 
Finally, evaluates the viability of a strategic alliance 
rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur.11(2):161-185,2016
THE NEW HIDEOUT OF COCKROACHES? THE EXPANSION OF THE MEXICAN ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE NORTHERN 
TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA
162 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
between two actors with greater preponderance in the criminal scene of the area: 
Los Zetas and Mara Salvatrucha. The paper concludes that, by its geographical 
location, its porous borders, its weakness institutional and growing sophistication 
of local criminal groups - transportistas- and gangs, the Northern Triangle of Central 
America provides spacious opportunities for Mexican drug trafficking expansion
Keywords: Central America; Drug traffic; Mexico.  
¿EL NUEVO ESCONDITE DE LAS CUCARACHAS? LA EXPANSIÓN DEL 
CRIMEN ORGANIZADO MEXICANO EN EL TRIÁNGULO NORTE DE 
AMÉRICA CENTRAL
RESUMEN
Uno de los efectos más latentes ocasionados por la estrategia de confrontación 
abierta al crimen organizado, mantenida en México desde el sexenio pasado, ha 
sido el traslado de los principales grupos criminales hacia el Triángulo Norte de 
América Central. A partir de ese escenario, el presente artículo de investigación 
tiene como objetivo responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿Por qué aquel territorio se 
ha transformado en el nuevo centro de operaciones para los principales carteles 
mexicanos? Para tal efecto, se analizan, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, los principales 
factores que han facilitado la expansión del crimen organizado mexicano en esa 
área geográfica. Luego, se abordan las conexiones y dinámicas entre los carteles 
mexicanos y otras organizaciones criminales operativas en esa subregión como los 
transportistas y maras. Finalmente, se evalúa la viabilidad de una alianza estratégica 
entre dos actores con mayor preponderancia en la escena criminal de aquella zona: 
Los Zetas y Mara Salvatrucha. El trabajo concluye que, por su ubicación geográfica, 
sus fronteras porosas, su debilidad institucional y creciente sofisticación de sus grupos 
criminales locales −transportistas− y maras, el Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica 
ofrece amplias oportunidades para la expansión del narcotráfico mexicano.
Palabras clave: Centroamérica, México, narcotráfico.
O NOVO ESCONDERIJO DE BARATAS? A EXPANSÃO DO CRIME 
ORGANIZADO MEXICANO NO TRIÂNGULO NORTE DA AMÉRICA 
CENTRAL
RESUMO
Um dos efeitos mais latentes causados pela estratégia de confronto aberto com 
o crime organizado, realizado no México nos últimos seis anos, tem sido a 
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transferência dos principais grupos criminais para o Triângulo Norte da América 
Central. Neste cenário, a pesquisa deste artigo destina-se a responder à pergunta 
seguinte: Por que este território tornou-se o novo centro de operações para os 
principais grupos de crimes organizados mexicanos? Para este fim, são analisados 
sob uma abordagem qualitativa, os principais fatores que facilitaram a expansão 
do crime organizado nessa área geográfica. Em seguida, conexões e dinâmica 
entre as organizações criminais mexicanas e outras organizações criminosas que 
operam nesta sub-região como portadores e “maras” é abordada. Finalmente, 
avalia a viabilidade de uma parceria estratégica entre dois personagens com 
maior preponderância na cena criminal da área: Los Zetas e Mara Salvatrucha. 
O jornal conclui que, pela sua localização geográfica, suas fronteiras porosas, sua 
fraqueza institucional e crescente sofisticação de seus grupos criminosos locais - 
transportadoras - e maras, o Triângulo Norte da América Central oferece amplas 
oportunidades para a expansão do tráfico de drogas mexicano.
Palavras-Chave: América Central; México; Tráfico de Droga.
Introduction
The War on Drugs driven Mexico 
during the government of Felipe 
Calderon (2006-12) it has been 
identified as the main catalyst for 
the movement of organized crime 
into the Northern Triangle of Central 
America, Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador-producing the so-called 
cockroach effect3 as shown in Figure 
1. This situation can be interpreted 
in several ways: From the standpoint 
of national security, migration caused 
by this criminal strategy to combat 
drug trafficking organizations can 
be considered a success because it 
forced the drug organizations move 
much of its operations outside the 
Mexican territory and also caused 
a change in the corridors of access 
to the US market. However, at the 
neighborhood level it can be classified 
as a failure because it passed a security 
of a State other border unprepared to 
fight criminal gangs or illegal activities 
displaced from the sending country 
-Mexico-. In short, the cockroach effect 
towards the north Central American 
sector demonstrates the militarized 
3 According to Bruce Bagley, the cockroach effect occurs when criminal organizations to avoid detection by 
the authorities after the light has been lit on them move from one municipality to another, from one city 
to another, from one country to another; or from one region to another in search of a better context to set 
and carry out their criminal activities. See: Garzón, 2013, p.12
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approaches can become effective in 
their task of combating transnational 
organized crime at the state level, but 
not at the sub regional level (Servitja 
Roca, 2012).
Figure 1. Central America: Transit and conflict area.
Source: Extracted from Pérez, 2014.
Thus, the use of the armed forces in 
some states of Mexico, especially 
border, exerted pressure on organized 
crime operating in them. This means 
that the more military presence there, 
unless border crossings are enabled 
for the transit of illicit trafficking 
and this causes a bottleneck, i.e. 
the convergence of routes within a 
few access roads and the resulting 
clash of groups to control them or 
facilitate the income from their illicit 
products. To increase the human 
and material costs of drug trafficking 
along the northern border of Mexico, 
as well as the degree of danger 
on the roads because of violence 
generated in disputes - added to the 
increasing US pressure to intercept 
Caribbean routes-, posters had to seek 
alternative routes to Mexico as the 
traditional gateway to North America, 
generating incentives for drug racking 
be relocated on the southern border, 
using Northern Triangle nations as a 
transit point for the purpose to control 
the route in its entirety, “turning this 
area into a bottleneck through which 
almost all the cocaine coming from 
South America, particularly in Bolivia, 
Colombia and Peru and destined for 
the United States” (Dudley, 2012a, 
p.10) as illustrated by the data given 
in Figure 2
Figure 2: Tons of cocaine seized in Central America (2006-12)
Source: Own production from UNODC, 2012. 
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The main Mexican cartels often seek 
a path of least resistance for their 
criminal activities, and in that sense 
it seems that the Northern Triangle 
has become a strategic point for the 
following reasons: 
Geographic location
For be between largest cocaine 
producer –Colombia- and the largest 
consumer of it the worldwide - United 
States-.  
Because of its proximity to Mexico 
with signs that control traffic routes 
it has begun to be used as drug store 
them. 
For the vast expanse of coast which 
provide that avails for the arrival of 
shipments of illicit trafficking by sea.
By owning spaces and border regions 
lacking or absent state control points 
rule of law that remain unidentified 
blind-along most of its length. In 
addition, official adjacent crossings are 
few, far between and do not have the 
necessary equipment or to deter illegal 
traffic of drugs, arms and people staff 
(Ramsey, 2012)
Institutional weakness
By having a number of structural deficits 
that encourage the establishment of 
a relationship between organizations 
drug traffickers and governments based 
on a transactional paradigm, i.e., logic 
of exchange between government 
officials or political authorities and 
criminal groups which is a network of 
institutionalized corruption replaced 
the rule of law4. Thus, “the exchanges 
include admission fee for loads of 
cocaine in exchange for money; support 
for a political campaign in exchange 
for protection for criminal activities; 
loyalties changing in parliament 
regarding situations related to organized 
exchange for luxury coastal properties 
partisan crime; court decisions in cases 
of neglect or deliberate stalling of them 
in exchange for economic benefits; 
access to prisons for the killing of key 
witnesses in exchange for thousands of 
dollars; or payments to police officers 
to commit murder” (Farah, 2013, p.91).
These links based on a high degree of 
tolerance by the State -fighting illicit 
economies marginally or inefficiently 
in best cases- are needed to avoid 
disruption of the development of illicit 
operations by the authorities. The 
4 Chabat poses that criminal groups may have different types of organization depending on the illicit 
economy developed and the relationship established with the State. Thus, the relationship between the 
State and the criminal organization can go through three phases: predatory (low capacity, low relative 
importance), parasitic (interaction limited between the State and criminals) and finally symbiotic (State 
structures work to benefit criminal organizations). See: 2008, p.4
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result of this is “the failure of the state 
as an entity on many levels, which 
are actively covered by transnational 
organized crime”(Farah, 2013, p.92). 
In sum, States will determine the shape 
or type of the criminal organization 
that operates and strengthened in a 
given territory (Garzón Vergara, 2013).
Production costs
The need that Mexican cartels have 
to be close production centers, 
which influences the acquires value a 
substance in the Mexican market against 
price recorded in Central America. 
This means that the closer the Aztecs 
criminal organizations where drugs are 
produced, they can buy cheaper and 
better your profits. For example, “the 
price level reaching cocaine in Mexico 
City -US $ 18,000/kg- compared to 
the price in Guatemala -US $ 12,000 
/ kg-provides incentives for purchase in 
the second region and subsequent sale 
on the first, without doubt influencing 
drug traffickers to move to the southern 
border” (Dudley, 2012a, p.11).  
The new coordinates of violence
According to the report Transnational 
Organized Crime in Central America 
and the Caribbean: An evolving 
threats, published by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
-UNODC- in 2012, the Pacific 
Cartel and Los Zetas have not only 
taken to Northern Triangle 90% of its 
operations to traffic cocaine into the 
United States (see Figure 3), but their 
battles for plazas5 control located in 
the sub region, which are fought by 
local criminal organizations co-opted 
by their Mexican counterparts, these 
being the main problem disputes 
crime that plagues this area of  the 
subcontinent (Martinez, 2013).
Thus, these nations who survived 
political violence armed-conflicts and/
or military repression during the Cold 
War now suffer the vicissitudes of a 
war between organized crime. Making 
situation that Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador in the most violent 
countries in the world, high rates 
of homicides recorded realize that 
classification (see Figure 4). 
The link between drugs and criminal 
violence in the Northern Triangle 
is different to that experienced in 
Mexico due to the complex interaction 
of various criminal actors with history, 
activities and modus operandi 
traditionally different. Thus, those in 
the Northern Triangle criminal groups 
5 The plaza has been used to describe the territories where they traffic drugs along the border of the United 
States with Mexico. Most of the major cartels were associated to a specific place, usually focused on one 
of the two twin border cities. Control the plaza entails an important flow of revenue associated. See: 
UNODC, 2012, p.19
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can be classified as Managers and 
Transportistas:
The managers are the ones who 
control the route and have the 
power of decision. This role is 
exercised in full by the Mexican 
cartels that are set in the sub region. 
These product obtained illicit traffic 
directly from the source markets. 
For reception, storage, transport 
and protection to the final market, 
they hire local groups monitored 
by them known as transportistas, in 
turn, can act as dealers in the local 
market as part of their work is paid 
Figure 3: Influence of the Pacific Cartel and Los Zetas in Central 
America
Source: Extracted from Pérez Ventura, 2014. 
Figure 4: Homicide rate per every 100,000/room Northern Triangle (2006-14).
Source: Own production from ACAPS, 2014
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with the product trafficked. (Servitja 
Roca, 2012, p.9)
Normally the Sinaloa Cartel and Los 
Zetas conduct their affairs in the sub 
region through local allies mostly. 
Thus, members of these two rivals 
drug cartels “usually they negotiate 
agreements, with surprising that 
the Mexican cartels are involved 
directly in operations carried out 
abroad”(Farah, 2013, p.98). Emerging 
conflict between the two models 
of transnational organized crime in 
accordance with their interests in the 
Northern Triangle: Business model –
Sinaloa Cartel- and territorial model 
– Los Zetas-. Indeed, each country 
has experienced changing degrees 
of cooperation between non-state 
actors -managers and transportistas, as 
detailed below. 
Guatemala
According to the report Guatemala: 
Drug trafficking and violence prepared 
by the International Crisis Group, the 
outbreak of the Mexican cartels is the 
latest in a vicious circle of violence and 
institutional failure episode. Geography 
has made this country -located at the 
north end of Central America- “in 
one of the busiest intersections for 
illicit drugs. Cocaine and now the 
ingredients for synthetic drugs entering 
by air, land and sea. Hence it follows 
Mexico en route to the United States. 
Added to this is the cool highlands 
offer ideal climate poppy cultivation. 
Because of lax regulations and a long 
history of smuggling, weapons abound. 
An impoverished and underemployed 
population is a good source of recruits” 
(ICC, 2011, p.3).
The Sinaloa Cartel is already operating 
in the Pacific region in Guatemala. 
Indeed, this criminal organization 
has established strong links with 
major trasportistas Guatemala: The 
Mendozas -based in the northern 
province of Petén apparently you have 
provided the Mexican drug cartel for 
more than a decade. The strategy used 
by the Sinaloa Cartel to expand its 
influence in the neighboring country 
is mainly based on a business model 
locally “as a creator of employment 
opportunities, health care provider, 
even assuming the role of government 
to eliminate small criminal groups in 
areas under their control” (TNI,2012, 
p.9). This action is very different from 
Los Zetas, “who they are based in 
a vertical structure and brute force, 
which may explain the success of 
the Sinaloa Cartel to prevent Los 
Zetas take control of the province of 
Huehuetenango” (TNI, 2012, p.10) 
crucial area for drug trafficking.
Meanwhile, Los Zetas have evolved 
to the point of becoming one of the 
greatest threats to domestic security 
from their arrival in Petén in 2007, 
when they established an alliance 
with the Guatemalan trafficker 
Horst Walther Overdick. They have 
even been identified as the biggest 
criminal organization with nationwide 
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presence because approximately 75% 
of the Guatemalan territory it controls 
(Dudley, 2013a).These explosive 
increases in its degree of influence 
tend to be explained in two ways: 
First, obey the successful tactics of 
recruitment among members of local 
criminal organizations whose leaders 
have been jailed. Furthermore, local 
criminal elements operate according 
to logic incompatible with Los Zetas 
and, therefore, prevent this group to 
recruit local high-level positions within 
the organization. However, as is well 
known Los Zetas, whose origin is in 
a group of defectors from the former 
Airmobile Special Forces Group who 
were initially hired as enforcers for 
the Gulf Cartel in the 90’s- have 
established links with the former 
commands Kaibiles unit of Special 
Forces of Guatemala. These former 
officers have helped this Mexican cartel 
providing intensive military training in 
logistics and heavy weaponry to new 
members, which fits perfectly with the 
military perspective cultivated by Los 
Zetas. Which seems to be part of a 
broader strategy consists in recruiting 
members to reduce costs Kaibiles 
indoctrination and training as well as 
for firearms and grenades Guatemalan 
military (Bargent, 2013).
As in Mexico, Los Zetas were unveiled 
at the North Triangle for their extreme 
violence, instead of gradually cultivate 
community support and bribe officials 
and local police, they attempted to take 
control of the drug routes by strength. 
One example is the slaughter of 29 
peasants in the department of Peten in 
May 2011, an episode that has been 
interpreted as an attack by the cartel 
to a local drug dealer operating in this 
sector. 
Currently they exert territorial control 
over the cocaine trade in the top 
five provinces -Petén Guatemala, 
Huehuetenango, Quiché, Alta 
Verapaz and Zacapa- through the 
band known as The Lorenzanas on 
a route that crosses the country from 
the border with Honduras to the 
border with Mexico as shown in Figure 
5. In addition, four other adjacent 
municipalities with Honduras and with 
access to the Pacific coast -Chiquimula, 
Jutiapa, Jalapa and Santa Rosa were 
caught by the local group Los Zetas 
dominant Lions, whose leadership 
was shot by Mexican drug trafficking 
organization.
Figure 5:Territorial influence Los Zetas in Guatemala
Source: Extracted from Martinez (2013)
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Honduras
Mexican cartels have participated in 
the narcotics industry in soil Honduran 
for at least fifteen years. But after 
the overthrow of Manuel Zelaya in 
2009-and the complete disregard 
for organized crime by the interim 
government - served to expand its 
power at the expense of local groups 
(TNI, 2012 p.10). Indeed, Honduras 
has become a major transfer point 
between Colombian cocaine and 
Mexican cartels -even it is considered 
the main airlift for that substance from 
South America, Venezuela being the 
starting point-. 
An example signal the dismantling of 
a cocaine laboratory in March 2011, 
with the capacity to process one ton 
of cocaine belonging to monthly- 
Sinaloa cartel, which is significantly 
more powerful than its counterpart 
in Honduras, Los Zetas. In fact, it has 
been speculated that Honduras has 
been used by its leader, Joaquin El 
Chapo Guzman as a hideout after his 
recent escape (Gagne, 2015a).
Thus, the Sinaloa Cartel has established 
a transport route to mobilize large 
amounts of cocaine by air and 
speedboats between Colombia and 
Honduras before sending it to the 
north. The Mosquito Coast, located on 
the border with Nicaragua lacks state 
presence so it serves as a refuge for local 
groups cooperating with the cartel. Such 
operations are also carried out in other 
northern provinces as Yoro, Atlantida, 
Colon and Olancho. Indeed, the 
Sinaloa cartel controls the production 
of ecstasy and methamphetamines-
specifically in the department 
of Olancho- that are shipped to 
Europe and the United States. There 
are also reports that shipments of 
pseudoephedrine a precursor for the 
production of metanfetaminas- from 
Asia and Western Europe pass through 
Honduras under the responsibility 
of the Mexican criminal group. In 
that direction, customs officials have 
reported that the Sinaloa Cartel use 
land routes that cross the border 
between Honduras and Guatemala. 
While Los Zetas have it has been 
detected in the four Northern 
provinces: Ocotepeque, Copan, 
Colon, and Atlantis (McDermott, 
2013). Also, the Mexican cartel 
has hired former Honduran police 
officers to provide protection for drug 
trafficking operations, and help with 
operations of kidnapping and extortion 
of migrants, one of the principal illicit 
activities of this organization drug 
trafficker6. Based on the foregoing, 
6 The brutal psychological tactics associated with the Mexican cartel are becoming increasingly common in 
this country because they have proven to be effective in the control of the civilian population, as well as 
the ranks of organizations. See: Parkinson, 2013a 
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one can conclude that this criminal 
group and has not only representatives 
in Honduras in order to supervise the 
receipt and transportation of shipments 
of cocaine from South America, but 
has established a formal presence 
translated into military capability. 
El Salvador
Following Bartolomé & Sampó (2014), 
the smallest of the Northern Triangle 
country meets two conditions that 
make it attractive to Mexican cartels. 
First, considering its northern 
territory –close to the border 
with Guatemala- has been 
institutionalized as a meeting place 
for leaders of criminal organizations 
not only resolve their differences 
there, but enjoy impunity needed 
to design strategies and plans to 
enable them to carry out their 
operations. And secondly, the lack 
of programs to combat money 
laundering and the dollarization of 
the economy, currency movements 
possible from drug trafficking and 
weapons from there to Europe and 
the United States. (p.102)
In this country, transportistas are 
responsible for protecting shipments 
of cocaine coming out of Colombia 
and Ecuador, through Central America 
all the way to Mexico. Thus, the main 
Salvadoran criminal organizations 
have strong connections with the 
Sinaloa Cartel: Texas Cartel -whose 
network operates in the northwest 
of the country- and Los Perrones 
-located in the East and around the 
region- have links with the West that 
criminal group Aztec dating back 
at least to 2002 (Gagne,2015a). 
Members of both groups are 
responsible for ensuring that the 
cocaine smuggled from El Salvador to 
be transported safely from the Pacific 
coast to Guatemala or Mexico, where 
it is delivered to the Mexican drug 
trafficking organization. 
Instead, The Zetas don’t yet have an 
operational presence in El Salvador, so 
far, have chosen to occasionally send 
key members located in Guatemala. 
Although an episode arms trafficking 
case in 2013 suggests a link between 
them and the Texis Cartel might 
constitute a novel criminal synergy, as 
the local government has increased 
pressure on the Salvadoran group7.
Moreover, the sub regional panorama 
discussed above allows the following 
scenarios envisage the short and 
medium term:
7 213 anti-tank grenades stolen from the Salvadoran army in a house in the central city of the Congo, as signs 
of the National Civil Police, were going to be used for the Mexican cartel by a shuttle provided by the Texis 
Cartel were uncovered in October 2013. This version is plausible considering that the Salvadoran group 
is known for its transportation services to anyone willing to pay, and is involved with several transnational 
groups. See: Parkinson, 2013b
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First, from the current stage 
bipolar-dominated by the Sinaloa 
Cartel and Los Zetas presence 
and operations of other Mexican 
criminal groups smaller in the 
Northern Triangle seems to have 
more of a complementary residual 
and therefore the small drug 
trafficking organizations could 
be annexed by the great. In this 
case, the tactical alliances benefit 
the Sinaloa Cartel because of its 
strong commercial orientation in 
contrast to the military perspective 
of Los Zetas. However, this does 
not imply that the Mexican cartels 
possess such a capability that allows 
“impose its authority to Guatemalan 
[Honduran or Salvadoran] criminal 
because it would require a capacity 
to control social strength and 
knowledge of the terrain with only 
about their area of  influence”. 
(Villalobos, 2011a, p.17) 
The second possibility would be 
favorable to small criminal groups, 
which eventually inherit trafficking 
routes along with control of drug flows, 
but its realization will depend largely 
on two factors: the confrontation 
between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los 
Zetas is performed on Mexican soil and 
the effects of these posters persecution 
by the Aztecs authorities. 
The third scenario would be that the 
weakening of the Mexican cartels, 
we could see the strengthening and 
increasing role of the Central American 
criminal organizations trafficking 
networks at the sub regional level. 
Indeed, leading candidates to take over 
that role would be the Texis Cartel on 
Salvadoran ground and Los Mendozas 
in Guatemalan territory (Fox, 2012). 
Therefore, the history of drug diffusion 
linking Colombia with Mexico could 
be repeated in Central America in 
light of the relative achievements 
of the strategy to combat the Aztec 
government. 
In a fourth scenario, the fragmentation 
of the Mexican cartels rather lead to a 
market of more plural and fragmented 
drug that would operate from three 
fronts-Mexico, Northern Triangle and 
Colombia. Under the assumption that 
the higher criminal atomization, greater 
state control capacity exist, a situation 
which in principle could be reflected in 
a greater responsiveness on the part of 
governments in the sub region. 
Finally, another projection is that the 
Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas could 
reach an agreement on their respective 
areas of geographical influence - 
advocate a pax mafiosa-. Although 
the possibility of occurrence is very 
low because the differences between 
criminal actors-from the strategic, 
operational and organizational-angle 
are simply irreconcilable.  
Unexpected convergence? Mexican 
cartels, Trasportistas and Maras.
As noted in the previous section the 
two main Mexican cartels - Sinaloa 
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Cartel and Los Zetas- criminal 
networks have been established in 
the North Triangle allying with local 
actors such as transportistas. However, 
they have also forged ties with cells 
or cliques of gangs, particularly the 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 
18 (M-18). Now, the question arises: 
what is the origin and how they have 
developed these links?
According to Cruz’s arrival gangs to the 
North Triangle during the 90s -product 
of mass deportation by United States- 
It marked the first transition from 
one “model of traditional, local, and 
atomized, an organized, hierarchical 
and transnational identity model” 
gang (Santamaría, 2013, p.66). Then, 
in mid-2000, the adoption of policies 
hard hand against gangs by Central 
American governments plus the 
expansion of drug trafficking networks 
in the sub region generated a second 
transition.
Thus, they mutated into a criminal gang 
mode “farthest from the traditional gang 
and closer to a model of criminal gang, 
in which [the gain] extortion and drug 
dealing has been accentuated as the 
moving head of these groups through 
strategic alliances with other criminal 
organizations” (Santamaría, 2013, 
p.67) as transportistas. In this regard, it 
is noteworthy that prison overcrowding 
caused by the application of these 
repressive measures against gangs 
provided contacts necessary for them 
to enter into such circuits, operating as 
a facilitator to transition them to new 
forms of organized crime8. Therefore, 
the strategy to combat gangs in 
Northern Triangle had an unexpected 
effect: a growing intersection between 
the activities of transnational organized 
crime, local criminal groups and gangs.
However, it is not possible to argue 
that this new phase necessarily implies 
lasting agreements between gangs 
and other criminal organizations as 
the Northern Triangle it’s difficult 
“establish whether this transition 
has been collective and consensual 
manner or if certain cells or gang 
members who choose to participate 
in these transnational organized 
crime networks is rather limited” 
(UNODC, 2012, p.13). Indeed, gangs 
face a number of alternatives ranging 
from joining these criminal groups to 
directly confront them while “each 
clica has significant levels of autonomy 
to manage their resources, provide for 
their subsistence and manage their 
income” (Garzón Vergara,2014).  
Although there is evidence of alleged 
links between some leaders of MS-
8 In October 2012, the Department of the Treasury of United States appointed MS-13 as a Transnational 
Criminal Organization on the grounds that the gang was involved in cross-border criminal activities, 
including international drug trafficking. Rating that puts this camera at the same level as Los Zetas, Italian 
Camorra and Japanese Yakuza. See: Sáiz, 2012
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13 and Barrio 18 structures of drug 
trafficking, the truth is gangs as a whole 
have not decided to get involved in 
these criminal networks, rather it is 
active members or former members 
who are recruited sporadically to 
provide certain services to drug 
cartels such as Los Zetas and Sinaloa 
Cartel9. Thus, “maras are inserted 
into transnational criminal networks 
as intermediaries between the main 
players in drug trafficking” (Farah, 2012, 
p.57), being responsible, for example, 
protects shipments “from the ports to 
the interior of the sub region by land, 
which gave rise to calls transportistas 
networks” (Farah, 2012, p.59). 
From this perspective, the role of 
gang members appears to have 
“becomes important product 
atomization resulting from the war 
on drugs, in a form of outsourcing” 
(Santamaría, 2014, p.4) but these 
continue to occupy a secondary role 
in transnational criminal economy. 
In large part, this is because Mexican 
cartels conceive Central American 
gangs as unsophisticated and unable 
to solve the problems involved in the 
management of drug trafficking groups 
because they have a more localized 
and relaxed activity in “the appearance 
of its members, particularly their facial 
tattoos denoting allegiance to a specific 
camera, making them unsuitable 
for public interactions in operations 
requiring low profile” (TNI, 2012, 
p.8). Indeed, the tactics employed by 
some kidnappings extortions- like cells 
and demonstrate the lack of discipline 
and professionalism of criminal gangs, 
which reinforces the reluctance of 
Mexicans to establish sustainable links 
with them posters. 
On the other hand, it has stated 
that the Central American gangs are 
strengthening and may control the 
operations of drug trafficking in the sub 
region to eventual decline of the main 
Aztec criminal organizations. In 2012 
the current Assistant Secretary of State 
of the Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, William 
Brownfield, during a conversation with 
the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, 
said the following:
Four years ago we started a 
multinational effort in Mexico, 
dominated by the Mexican 
government, and what do we see 
today? In my opinion, we are seeing 
9 A exceptional case is Moris Alexander Bercián Manchón, alias the Barney - located in the high hierarchy 
of the MS - who is involved in the transport and distribution of drugs, possibly in the transnational 
environment, as well as homicides, and possibly, money laundering, being mentioned in a press release 
from the Treasury Department about gangs: “Bercián Manchón has been involved in drug trafficking 
operations on behalf of the criminal organization”. Indeed, its possible allies include Texis Cartel and Los 
Zetas while his main enemy is Barrio 18. In both his ability to establish a transnational network of drugs 
has been possible thanks to his father, a former Colonel in the Guatemalan army, which allegedly has links 
with some of the most powerful figures in the Central American underworld. See: Dudley, 2013
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the beginning of the end with the 
beheading of posters and reducing 
its operating capacity [...] they felt 
the pressure from the authorities and 
their response was violence. What 
we know today - we didn’t know 
then--is that this was the signal of an 
organization on the verge of collapse 
due to the pressure sustained on 
operations in the region. (Vega, 2012) 
Thus, the more interaction there 
between cartels and gangs, both players 
will have more opportunities to engage 
in a symbiotic relationship. Under 
this logic, the gangs could advance 
their criminal agenda and increase 
their level of professionalism criminal, 
which would allow them to acquire 
greater prominence in the movement 
of drugs to the detriment of the Aztecs 
criminal groups. Giving way to a similar 
situation that occurred in Colombia 
during the late 80’s and early 90’s: as 
the government eroded the capacities 
of the major cartels -Medellin and Cali- 
from their Mexican counterparts were 
increasing their power and influence 
on cocaine trafficking to the United 
States to take its role in the geopolitics 
of drugs. This is how the Colombian 
organized crime today seems to be just 
a supplier of Mexican cartels.  
And while recent statement from 
the Treasury Department of the 
United States uncovered that the 
gang participation in drug trafficking 
operations in the sub region has 
expanded as “clicas [or gangs] local 
follow international guidelines 
established by the group’s leaders to 
make strategic decisions involving 
moves into new territories and 
recruiting new members” (Cawley, 
2013a), added have joined gaining 
presence by charging a tax of war 
transportistas circulating through their 
territories10. However, the idea that 
criminal gangs form a complex network 
that achieves take control of key links 
of drug trafficking -snatching control of 
the routes to transportistas and Mexican 
drug traffickers- it is impractical given 
their poor organizational sophistication 
expressed in the lack of “means, the 
knowledge, the contacts, the capacity 
to accumulate capital, and the ability 
to use that capital to expand their 
businesses. They are simply focused 
organizations ensure their subsistence” 
(Dudley, 2013b). 
Another reason lies in the sporadic 
and opportunistic gangs linking with a 
specific Mexican cartel, in the case of 
Guatemala with Los Zetas in Honduras 
with the Sinaloa Cartel and Salvadoran 
soil with Texis Cartel or failing to Los 
Perrones. As in any economy -licit or 
illicitly- relationships with suppliers, 
transport agents and buyers are not 
10 Statistics suggest that the northern triangle is the epicenter of global extortion, is how Salvadorans paid 
about US $400 million a year by extortion gangs, followed by Hondurans, who paid about US $200 
million, and Guatemalans, with around US $61 million. See: Dudley, & Lohmuller, 2015 
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exclusive, that is, each link is free to 
form bonds with others in the absence 
of a common source of authority 
or sharing of funds. After all, in a 
commercial supply chain it is easy to 
replace a link.
Linked to this, the displacement of the 
criminal operations of the Northern 
Triangle Mexico has resulted in a 
shift in gears underground economy 
as drug trafficking organizations tend 
to use illicit substances as a means 
of payment for their services gang 
members (Dudley, 2012b), then these 
contract workers directly consume or 
sell drugs on the streets, which also 
contributes to their involvement in 
trafficking networks is residual.     
Also for this replacement it would 
need to materialize that gangs increase 
their presence in Mexico -which until 
now only restricted to Baja California, 
Tamaulipas, Chihuahua and Chiapas- 
(Vega, 2012), will be more difficult 
than it was for the Mexican cartels 
migrate to the Northern Triangle 
because the Aztec government has a 
high degree of institutional strength in 
relation to the countries in this sector 
in Central America because, as noted 
at beginning of this work, Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations knew 
precisely exploit state weakness that 
characterizes this geographical area to 
develop their illicit trafficking.
From another angle, it has warned 
that aggressive anti-gang policies 
executed in the North triangle have 
caused several members of maras opt 
to start operations in other countries 
of Central America (Daugherty, 2015). 
That is, they are producing one second 
cockroach effect. As a recent report 
of the Judicial Investigation Agency of 
Costa Rica -Organismo de Investigación 
Judicial-, members of street gangs 
Barrio 18 and MS they have expanded 
their presence in the country since the 
mid of the last decade. Thus, Costa 
Rica could become their next hiding 
place for the following reasons (Gagne, 
2015b):
Some Mexican transnational criminal 
organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel 
they have been active in Costa Rica 
from some years ago, So its presence 
can facilitate their growth. 
The growing importance of the 
country as a transit point has promoted 
a growing local drug market offering 
huge profits to gangs.
Vulnerability to the judicial system 
against organized crime could enable 
them to operate relatively quiet.
Costa Rica doesn’t record a history of 
mano dura approach as applied in the 
Northern Triangle to fight gangs. 
Bad partners? Evaluating a 
partnership between Los Zetas and 
Mara Salvatrucha.
In the wake of increasing intersection 
between organized crime activities 
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre
Esteban Arratia Sandoval
177
transnational, local criminal groups 
and gangs in the North Triangle, some 
authors like Douglas Farah & Phillips 
Lum (2013) have raised the alleged 
existence of a synergy between Los 
Zetas and Mara Salvatrucha -as a result 
of the truce that MS-13 and Barrio 18 
launched in El Salvador, between 2012 
and 2013- but it is not yet clearly sees 
what and how viable would be such a 
connection.
In fact, there have been several 
hypotheses about: Salvadoran 
authorities point out that “Mara 
Salvatrucha wants to increase your 
arsenal of long-range weapons, 
grenades and drugs for use and to 
sell. They know that the economic 
benefit is enormous and Los Zetas, 
being a foreign group, need their 
networks to increase their operational 
level and thus be able to control all 
activities: legitimate, illegitimate and 
criminal” (Ruiz-Goiriena, 2012). In 
that direction, Scott Stewart, an analyst 
at Strategic Forecasting, says the MS is 
increasingly willing to work with Los 
Zetas “the economic power of the 
criminal organization, allowing it to 
operate in countries such as El Salvador 
and reduce it costs to the local market. 
Thus there is an incentive to cooperate 
with the organization or risk going out 
of business altogether” (Associated 
Press, 2012). Moreover, John Sullivan 
& Adam Elkus (2013) argue that a link 
between Los Zetas and MS-13 could 
benefit both parties, understood not 
as a joint venture; rather it would be 
a strategic alliance -highly unstable 
certainly-. Thus, while “MS members 
would gain a wide support network 
for its operation and expansion, Los 
Zetas acquires the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the gang, generating 
a greater risk to the governments of 
Central America” (p.9).  
However, the differentiated nature 
of Los Zetas and MS -from the 
organizational angle and operationally- 
acts as a potent antibody against a 
possible strategic alliance between the 
two criminal organizations (see Table 
1). Thus, the anarchy, indiscipline 
and functional autonomy of the 
Mara Salvatrucha - in contrast to the 
high levels of hierarchy, discipline, 
professionalism and sophistication that 
characterize Los Zetas - hinder their 
subordination to a cartel. Indeed, MS-
13 is a complex organization crossed 
by hierarchies but also horizontal 
relationships between cells or clicas 
that don’t necessarily have regular 
contact - unlike the Mexican criminal 
organization - resulting structure neo-
feudal character (Garzón Vergara, 
2014). This means that “it sustained 
by bonds of respect and loyalty in 
a hierarchy of influence but lacking 
sophistication allows the organization 
to a high degree of adaptability to a 
changing landscape” (Sullivan & Elkus, 
2013, p.8).
While this relative verticality has 
been functional to enforce a truce 
that has caused a drastic drop in 
homicides, it does not apply that has 
to do with the local support of gangs 
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(Garzón Vergara, 2014). Therefore, 
as previously it indicated, “each 
clica enjoys a significant degree of 
autonomy to engage in business 
deemed suitable methods deemed 
appropriate for survival” (Sullivan & 
Elkus, 2013, p.8). However, this highly 
decentralized structure rather restricts 
the possibilities of achieving a strategic 
agreement with Los Zetas. 
In contrast, transient and instrumental 
facilitate cooperation between the 
Zetas and the cells of the Mara 
Salvatrucha, since the latter could 
provide services in the form of 
mercenary soldier’s base. Although 
such a provision could be provided by 
other criminal act devoid of baggage 
associated with members of the MS-
13 as the side with the members of 
that gang, Los Zetas are automatically 
would make a powerful enemy: the 
Barrio 18, finding himself involved in 
a vicious gang war that obstruct the 
development of their activities. Add 
to that the fact that the provision of 
the MS as a whole in the Mexican 
drug trafficking organization certainly 
would impact on the feasibility 
of the agreements reached at the 
cellular level adds. Since each clica 
is independent, a contract with may 
not necessarily be respected by the 
others. For example, ensure the free 
movement along a route located in 
a controlled by the Mara Salvatrucha 
could mean negotiate and maintain 
a series of agreements with multiple 
partners’ unreliable territory. 
In addition, the interpretations of a 
link between non-state armed actors 
completely ignored the “identification 
of a criminal organization lies in family 
rituals or -derived occupational ties, 
ethnic and religious-that configure 
a hallmark against other groups” 
(Chabat, 2008, p.3). Thus, a franchise 
is established, “understood not only 
as a brand but also as a number of 
methods and know-how to develop 
Table 1: Profile Los Zetas vs. Mara Salvatrucha (MS)
Los Zetas Maras Salvatrucha (MS)
Type criminal organization Cartel Gang
Hierarchy High Medium
Structure Vertical Mix
Cohesion level High Low
Sophistication level High Low
Profesionalization level High Low
Violence level High High
Criminal activity diversification High Low
Transnational presence Medium High
Source: Own production from Dudley, S. 2012c.
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre
Esteban Arratia Sandoval
179
certain types of activities” (Chabat, 
2008, p.5).  
In that sense, Villalobos argues that the 
presence of Mexican cartels in Central 
America is “part of the coordination 
between criminal organizations and 
the use of violence as franchises Los 
Zetas” (Villalobos, 2011b). Indeed, 
former armed wing of the Gulf Cartel 
has followed a peculiar mode of 
diffusion as the Northern Triangle “nor 
they have only been coordinated with 
local criminal organizations, they have 
developed a model of transplantation” 
(Santamaría, 2013, p.70). Particularly 
in Guatemala, Los Zetas have 
successfully expanded the scope of 
its operations “by incorporating local 
actors as members of his organization, 
the paradigmatic expression of 
this model are the recruitment of 
Kaibiles” (UNODC, 2012, p.15). From 
this perspective, the existence of a 
military training and a similar code 
of conduct between Kaibiles and Los 
Zetas may have facilitated the spread 
and eventual transplantation of this 
organization in Guatemala. 
Although the preferences share violent 
methods seem to be a good incentive 
for cooperation between the Zetas 
and MS. The truth is that a synergy 
as described -under the model of 
transplantation- It is inapplicable to the 
case of the MS-13 as this camera has 
its own franchise based on complex 
initiation rituals through which the 
will of the applicants to belong to it, 
expressed in tattoos that identify them 
as part of that band is confirmed. 
Thus, this feature of the MS franchise, 
It makes “a highly visible group whose 
movements are closely monitored by 
the authorities” (Chabat, 2008, p.9) i.e. 
which would imply a high risk to the 
operations of Los Zetas operations11.
Indeed, “the existence of a MS-13 
brand is evident with the emergence 
of bands that use the franchise in 
Mexico, which have copied the 
structure and modus operandi of 
the original version” (Chabat, 2008, 
p.9). Therefore, “the structure 
reproduces itself in other companies 
with similar conditions -high poverty, 
marginalization, inequality and lack 
of economic opportunity- through 
know-how; inevitably it manages 
information across national borders” 
(Chabat, 2008, p.10). This situation 
has affected “There is no intent to 
monopolize or structure of the MS-13 
or criminal activities; by contrast, it has 
cooperated with copies to carry out its 
operations in Mexico” (Chabat, 2008, 
p.11). 
11 According to a report prepared by  Procuraduría General de República - PGR - Los Zetas employees have 
emulated directly beheading tactics by the MS, product of indoctrination and training provided by the 
gang, with the aim of intimidating opponents, confirm their presence at the site, and earn rankings within 
the criminal organization. See: Vega, 2012 
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And although It has said that the 
Aztec paramilitary organization seeks 
to assimilate members of one of the 
most violent factions of the MS-13, 
Fulton Locos Salvatruchas —FLS— 
and Hollywood Locos Salvatruchos 
—HLS— by ideological indoctrination 
(Ruiz-Goiriena, 2012). Version would 
be endorsed by the existence of 
training camps Los Zetas located in 
the region of Peten, Guatemala with 
“mobile camps in nearby San Salvador 
volcano in territory once controlled by 
the FMLN” (Farah, 2012, p.62). The 
truth is that it would be difficult to 
persuade members of the MS leaving 
his brothers to join another criminal 
organization with strong territorial 
roots as Los Zetas as it would require a 
complete reorientation of their values. 
Conclusions
The War on Drugs driven Mexico 
during the government of Felipe 
Calderon (2006-12) it has been 
identified as the main catalyst for the 
shift to the North Triangle -Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador- producing 
so called cockroach effect. This new 
scenario shows that the partial victories 
of a given nation may become a failure 
for your neighbors. 
The recent emergence of major Mexican 
cartels -Sinaloa and Los Zetas- in the 
sub region evidence both his desire 
to expand into new markets and find 
a refuge from the escalating Mexican 
authorities. Due to its geographical 
location -among the largest cocaine 
producer and the largest consumer 
of it worldwide-, its porous borders, 
weak institutions and increasing 
sophistication of local criminal groups 
-transportistas- and gangs, the area 
offers ample opportunities for Mexican 
drug cartels expansion. 
However, Mexican cartels have not 
only taken to Northern Triangle 
operations to traffic cocaine into the 
United States, but their battles for 
control of the streets located in this 
geographic area, which are fought by 
local criminal organizations, leading 
to various degrees of cooperation 
between non-state actors as the role 
of each country in the geopolitics of 
drugs. Thus, as criminal organizations 
are facing greater pressure, they seek 
new allies, and are associated with 
actors that are further down the chain 
to help them with the dirty work and 
protect their interests: diversify income 
sources and smuggling routes. 
In this regard, the adoption of policies 
hard hand against street gangs in the 
Northern Triangle, coupled with the 
expansion of drug trafficking networks 
in the sub region, it had an unexpected 
effect: Increasing intersection 
between the activities of transnational 
organized crime -Posters Mexicans, 
-transportistas- local criminal groups 
and gangs. Although it has been 
speculated the existence of an alleged 
synergy between Los Zetas and the 
Mara Salvatrucha, as a result of the 
MS-13 and Barrio 18 truce launched in 
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El Salvador between 2012 and 2013. 
The truth is the differentiated nature of 
both criminal organizations -from the 
organizational angle and operationally- 
it acts as a potent antibody against 
possible strategic alliance. 
Thus, the sub region consists of Mexico-
Northern Triangle of Central America, 
connected in turn with the United 
States has co-dependence dynamics 
that force us to think solutions to its 
security dilemma in transnational 
terms. Paradoxically, the way that 
many governments are fighting 
criminal organizations is limited to the 
local level-the criminal organizations 
operating in their national territory- 
and rarely establishes mechanisms to 
combat transnational phenomenon 
as design and implement policies 
that involve transnational exchange 
of information between governments 
and sometimes joint action to hit them 
simultaneously to multiple nodes of 
transnational network. 
Consequently, if the criminal diaspora is 
a direct -but undesirable- consequence 
high institutional pressure in certain 
countries such as Mexico, neighboring 
States should work in coordination 
with the aim of halting the expansion 
of criminal networks by developing 
mechanisms to contain the cockroach 
effect. Otherwise the success of a 
specific country could be seriously 
compromised by the actions of the 
same criminal group but this time 
running from a nearby territory such as 
Los Zetas in Guatemala.
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